We analyze models where agents search for partners to form relationships (employment, marriage, etc.), and may continue searching for di®erent partners while matched. Matched agents are less inclined to search if their match yields more utility and if it is more stable. If one partner searches the relationship is less stable, so the other is more inclined to search, potentially making instability a self-ful¯lling prophecy. We show this can generate a multiplicity { indeed, a continuum { of steady state equilibria. In any equilibrium there tends to be too much turnover, unemployment, and inequality, compared to the e±cient outcome. A calibrated version of the model explains 1/2 to 2/3 of reported job-to-job transitions.
Introduction
We analyze situations where agents search for partners to form bilateral relationships, such as marriage or employment relationships, with the following feature: while matched, an individual may at some cost continue to search for a di®erent partner. Matched agents are less inclined to search { that is, more inclined to be \faithful" to their current partner { if the match is better in the sense of instantaneous utility and also if it is more stable. What lends stability to a relationship? If your partner is searching, your relationship is less secure because you are more likely to be abandoned, and so you will be more inclined to search. Hence, instability can be a self-ful¯lling prophecy.
We show these considerations can lead to multiple equilibria, and indeed to a continuum of steady state equilibrium. We also study the implications for e±ciency. According to our results, there tends to be excessive turnover, unemployment and inequality in equilibrium.
The source of multiplicity and ine±ciency is new to the search literature, and has nothing to do with the thick-market or congestion e®ects that have been understood at least since Diamond (1982) , Hosios (1990) , and related work. For example, the usual thick-market e®ect works as follows: assuming increasing returns in the matching technology, if there is more search activity then it is easier to meet people, and this makes you more inclined to search.
To emphasize the distinction here we assume constant returns to scale in the matching technology, so that your probability of meeting someone is independent of aggregate search behavior, and make some other assumptions to reduce strategic interactions between individuals and the market. This allows us to focus more on strategic interactions within relationships and concentrate more on endogenous instability.
Our basic framework assumes that when any two agents meet they draw a random x describing the instantaneous utility that each will receive if they form a partnership. The simplest version of the model has a two point distribution, x 2 fx 1 ; x 2 g, with x 2 > x 1 . In this case, it is relatively easy to characterize the equilibrium set, and describe the parameter values that lead to multiplicity. A simple example (but not the only, nor necessarily the most interesting, example) of multiplicity is the following: for some parameters individuals could either be \faithful" or \unfaithful" in x 1 matches, depending on what they think others are doing. Perhaps surprisingly, for some parameters there can even be equilibria where agents are \unfaithful" in x 2 matches but \faithful" in x 1 matches, despite x 2 > x 1 , simply as a self-ful¯lling prophecy.
Whether or not there are multiple equilibria, there tends to be ine±ciently high levels of search, and this leads to ine±ciently high levels of turnover, unemployment and inequality. Two distinct types of ine±ciency are possible.
When there are multiple equilibria, excessive search can be interpreted as a coordination failure: you are \unfaithful" in certain matches because you think others will be, even though a better equilibrium exists where agents are \faithful" in these matches. However, we emphasize that this is not the only situation that can arise: sometimes a unique equilibrium exists, and it also tends to have excessive turnover, unemployment, and inequality.
The situation here is analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, not a coordination failure. The potential ways to correct the ine±ciencies in these two distinct situations is something we will discuss.
In the case where x is drawn from a general distribution, we consider equilibria of the following class: agents choose a reservation value R such that they enter relationships i® x¸R, and a critical value Q such that they search while matched i® x · Q. We show that any value of Q in some nondegenerate interval satis¯es all of the steady state equilibrium conditions:
i.e., there is a continuum of steady state equilibria. This is not a typical outcome. 1 The explanation lies in the value of x playing two roles: it conveys utility, but it can also be used as a signal for agents to coordinate on \faith-ful" or \unfaithful" behavior. The probability of searching while matched is increasing in Q, and even the best equilibrium tends to have Q above the e±cient outcome. Again, equilibrium has excessive turnover, unemployment and inequality.
There is reason to think searching while matched is empirically important. First, the number of job-to-job transitions is big. Fallick and Fleischman (2001) , e.g., report that in 1999 more than 4 million workers changed employers in an average month, about the same as the number who left em-ployment to exit the labor force and more than double the number who left for unemployment. Modeling on-the-job search is crucial for understanding this behavior. We can also infer from less formal data that searching while matched is important. For example, 13% of Canadian workers surveyed are actively seeking new jobs, and 45% while not actively searching would be willing to \consider other opportunities or o®ers" (Galt [2001] ). To see how well the model can account for on-the-job search, we calibrate it. It turns out that as long as we want to match the°ow from employment to nonemployment, the model can explain a sizable fraction (1=2 to 2=3) but not all of the job-to-job transitions in the Fallick and Fleischman data.
Generally, we think that on-the-job search and the implied possibility of endogenous instability seem interesting and have been neglected in the literature. A key new¯nding that arises here due to on-the-job search is the tendency towards excess turnover, unemployment and inequality. The rest of the paper involves making the model precise and proving our claims. Section 2 presents the basic structure. Section 3 analyzes the case where x 2 fx 1 ; x 2 g. Section 4 discusses robustness to alternative assumptions.
Section 5 analyzes the case of a general x distribution. For each version of the model we provide results on the existence and number of equilibria, on the steady state distribution of match quality, and on the comparison between equilibrium and e±cient outcomes. Section 5 describes the numerical results.
Section 6 provides a brief conclusion. Some of the more technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Basic Framework
There is a [0; 1] continuum of in¯nitely-lived agents who are interested in forming bilateral relationships. While unmatched, they search and receive instantaneous utility b from being single (net of any search costs). While searching they meet other agents according to a Poisson process with arrival rate ®. Agents are homogeneous ex ante, but matches are heterogeneous ex post: when a pair meet they draw a random variable x giving the instantaneous utility that each would receive if they form a partnership.
3 The distribution of potential match quality is F (x), and it is exogenous. The distribution of match quality across actual existing relationships is G(x), and is endogenous because agents may accept some values of x and reject others.
If you search while matched, you pay cost d > 0 and continue to meet new agents at rate ®; if you do not search you pay no cost and meet no one new. If you are matched and meet someone new, we make the following base assumption: you must¯rst leave your current partner before you draw the value of x associated with the new person, and you may then form a new relationship, or reject the new person and become unmatched, but you cannot go back to your old partner. This may or may not be realistic, depending on the application, but there are several reasons why it is a good assumption for our purposes. First, the alternative model, where you are allowed to go back, is much more complicated for a general distribution F .
Even for a simple speci¯cation of F , the analysis is less straightforward in the alternative model, and it turns out that the results are qualitatively the same as under the base assumption.
Moreover, our base assumption is appropriate if one wants to focus on the strategic interactions within relationships. To explain this, consider the opportunities available when you search. First, your arrival rate of meetings ® could depend on the number of agents searching, if the matching technology has non-constant returns. As this has been studied extensively in the past, we assume constant returns. However, even given a constant ®, if we allow a matched agent who meets someone new to choose between the new person and his current partner, your e®ective arrival rate will still be endogenous.
To see this, note that if matched agents are allowed to choose, they will only enter into a relationship with you if you beat their current value of x, and to know your chances of this you need to know the endogenous distribution Hence, the model has well-de¯ned notions of layo®s, quits and job-to-job transitions.
A Simple Model
In this section we assume x = x 2 with probability ¼ and x = x 1 < x 2 with probability 1 ¡ ¼. Agents can then be in one of three states: unmatched, in an x 1 relationship, or in an x 2 relationship. The fraction in each state is denoted N 0 , N 1 , and N 2 , where N 0 + N 1 + N 2 = 1. Let the payo®, or value, function of an agent in each state be V 0 , V 1 , and V 2 . Agents need to choose strategies for deciding when to accept a match and when to search while matched. Let A j be the probability that a representative agent agrees to enter into an x j match, and let S j be the probability that he searches while in an x j match, j = 1; 2. Sometimes we will be more explicit by saying that you choose a j and s j taking as given that others choose A j and S j ; in equilibrium, of course, a j = A j and s j = S j . We focus for now on pure strategy equilibria (mixed strategies are considered later).
The value functions satisfy the standard continuous time dynamic programming equations,
where § i is the net gain from searching while in an
For example, the third equation in (1) equates the°ow value rV 2 to the sum of three terms. The¯rst is the instantaneous utility x 2 . The second is the probability you become involuntarily unmatched, either because of an exogenous separation or because your partner meets someone new, ¾ + S 2 ®, times the capital loss V 0 ¡ V 2 . The¯nal term is your search decision s 2 times the net gain from searching while matched, § 2 .
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A steady state equilibrium is a list including value functions (V 0 ; V 1 ; V 2 ) satisfying the dynamic programming equations (1), a steady state (N 0 ; N 1 ; N 2 ) satisfying conditions to be given below, and strategies (A 1 ; A 2 ; S 1 ; S 2 ) satisfying the following best response conditions:
where ¢ j = V 1 ¡ V 0 is the net gain from accepting an x j match and § j is the net gain from searching in an x i match de¯ned above. Notice that we do not actually need to know the steady state to analyze search behavior, since the N j 's do not enter (1) or (2) due to our simplifying assumptions. Hence we can solve things recursively:¯rst determine (A 1 ; A 2 ; S 1 ; S 2 ) and (V 0 ; V 1 ; V 2 ), and later¯nd (N 0 ; N 1 ; N 2 ).
As we will show, of all possible pure strategy pro¯les, only¯ve potentially constitute equilibria. First, there is a \degenerate" or type D equilibrium where agents reject all matches:
there is what we call a \choosy" or type C equilibrium where agents accept x 2 but reject x 1 and, since they would not accept x 1 , do not search in x 2 matches: A 1 = 0, A 2 = 1 and S 2 = 0. Third, there is a \faithful" or type F equilibrium where agents accept x 1 as well as x 2 and do not search in either case: A 1 = A 2 = 1 and S 1 = S 2 = 0. Fourth, there is an \unfaithful" or type U equilibrium, in which agents accept both matches and continue to search in x 1 matches: A 1 = A 2 = 1, S 1 = 1 and S 2 = 0. Finally, there is a \perverse" or type P equilibrium where agents accept both and, perhaps counter to intuition, search in x 2 but not x 1 matches: A 1 = A 2 = 1, S 1 = 0 and S 2 = 1.
The following proposition describes exactly when each of the di®erent types of equilibria exist. The proof is given in the Appendix, but the method is straightforward: for any possible strategy pro¯le, simply solve for the value functions and check the best response conditions..
Proposition 1
There are¯ve potential types of equilibria:
exists i® x 2 · y 1 ; y 2 type U :
where the critical values y j are given by
There are no other pure strategy equilibria. The regions where the di®erent equilibria exist are depicted in (x 1 ; x 2 ) space in Figure 1 (type D equilibrium exists in the region labeled D, and so on). Notice, for example, that for the type F equilibrium to exist we need x 1 big enough so that agents accept it, and x 2 small enough so that agents stop searching once they do accept x 1 . For the type U equilibrium, x 2 must be large enough to make agents search in x 1 matches, but we also need x 1 large enough that agents prefer to accept x 1 and search, rather that reject x 1 and continue to search while unmatched. Observe that when x 2 2 (y 3 ; y 2 ) the type F and type U equilibria coexist; hence agents in x 1 matches may either be \faithful" or \unfaithful" depending on what other agents are doing. This is endogenous instability.
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Endogenous instability is su±ciently powerful that for some parameters there exists a \perverse" equilibrium where
simply because agents believe that x 2 matches will be unstable and these matches are in fact unstable because people search while in x 2 matches. This is only possible if x 1 is not too much less than x 2 , however, since agents will only sacri¯ce so much utility for security, and if x 1 and x 2 are large relative to b + d, since it is a high cost of separation that makes security important. Also notice that whenever the type P equilibrium exists there coexists another equilibrium (either a type U equilibrium, or both a type U and type F equilibria). In any case, we do not intend to dwell on \perverse"
outcomes, but mention the type P equilibrium as an extreme example of endogenous instability.
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We proceed to consider e±ciency, de¯ned in terms of a standard social planner's welfare criterion for this class of models, average lifetime income:
As x 2 < b implies the e±cient outcome is obviously A 1 = A 2 = 0, we assume here x 2 > b. Then any e±cient outcome clearly entails A 2 = 1 and S 2 = 0.
Hence, the type P equilibrium cannot possibly be e±cient, so we ignore it for now and ask when the planner prefers the type C, type F or type U strategies.
The answer is given below, where again the proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Given x 2 > b, the strategies that maximize W are as follows:
To compare equilibria and e±cient outcomes, it is best to begin with the limiting case r ! 0, since then the y 1 de¯ned in Proposition 1 coincides with the y A de¯ned in Proposition 2. This means that the region where
is an equilibrium coincides with the region where it is e±cient, and given that A 1 is e±cient, we can concentrate on the e±ciency of S 1 . Figure 2 shows a version of Figure 1 drawn with r ¼ 0, and highlights two regions in which the equilibrium di®ers from the planner's solution (in all other regions, equilibrium is e±cient). In the region labeled 1, the planner chooses the type F strategy but the unique equilibrium is type U. Here, there is unambiguously too much search, in the sense that S 1 = 1 is the unique equilibrium but the e±cient solution is S 1 = 0. In the region labeled 2, the planner again chooses the type F strategy, but now there are multiple equilibria, including type F but also including type U.
Figure 2: Regions of ine±ciency, r ¼ 0
The conclusion is that, at least when r is not too big, there is a tendency towards too much search. Heuristically, the reason is that if your partner decides to search while matched, they take into account their own costs and bene¯ts but neglect the cost on you. Before discussing the welfare results for large r, we¯rst want to compare the distributions across the equilibrium and e±cient outcomes. Begin by writing the net°ow of agents into x 1 matches as
where
single agents who¯nd an x 1 match and accept. The second term represents agents in x 2 matches who search,¯nd an x 1 match and accept. The¯nal term is°ow out of x 1 matches, including agents whose relationships break up exogenously, those who are abandoned by their partners, those who are searching and get an x 1 draw and reject it, and those who are searching and get an x 2 draw whether they accept or not.
There is a symmetric expression for _ N 2 , and steady state solves _ N 1 = _ N 2 = 0. Letting superscripts indicate the steady state in a particular equilibrium (e.g., N C 0 is the number of unmatched agents in type C equilibrium), the steady state in each type of equilibrium is described in the following might meet others who could have met you, and these e®ects exactly cancel under constant returns. This is standard in search theory, and is exactly why we assume constant returns { so that we can ignore these e®ects acrss macthes and focus on intra-match e®ects.
Proposition. As these results follow from routine algebra, we omit a proof.
Proposition 3 There is a unique steady corresponding to each type of equilibrium, given by
The key observation is that
The is relevant because when the equilibrium and e±cient outcomes di®er, it is because we are in a type U equilibrium but the planner's preferred strategies are type F. Hence, the planner prefers fewer unmatched agents, fewer x 2 matches, and more x 1 matches than obtain in equilibrium. In other words, the e±cient outcome involves less unemployment and less inequality.
Intuitively, too much search comes with too much inequality, simply because what agents are searching for is to move up in the distribution, and also too much unemployment, because one way they move up in the distribution is by abandoning their current partners.
The above welfare (but not steady state) results are for the case r ¼ 0.
The e®ect that generates too much search is there for any r, but for big r 9 This e®ect is due to di®erences in discount rates between the planner and private agents, is well understood, and is not especially interesting. What is novel here is the e®ect that tends to generate too much search, which in any event always dominates for small r. We summarize what has been shown in the following statement.
Proposition 4 At least for r not too big, either the equilibrium is e±cient, or the equilibrium has S 1 = 1 while the e±cient outcome has S 1 = 0, which means the equilibrium has too much search, too much unemployment, and too much inequality.
Robustness
In this section we discuss some robustness issues. To begin, we sketch the e®ect of changing the base assumption that you cannot stay with your old partner when you meet someone new. If we change this assumption, then in principle we need to generalize acceptance strategies by letting A i j be the probability that an agent enters into an x j match conditional on currently being in state i = 0; 1; 2. In the base model we did not need to condition acceptance decisions on the agent's state, since everyone is e®ectively single when they decide whether to accept x j . This complicates things, in general, although for the two-point distribution fx 1 ; x 2 g one can show that A i j = A j in equilibrium. Given this, the analogue of (1) is
In these expressions q 0 and q i are the probabilities that you meet an unmatched agent and an agent in a x i match, respectively:
This model is not recursive: the N i 's appear in (5), and so we need to solve for steady state before characterizing equilibria.
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Although this version is much messier, it turns out the results are qualitatively the same as those shown in Figure 1 . Indeed, the type D, type C type P equilibrium, A 1 1 For the record, in type D, type C or type F equilibria the steady state is the same as in the base model, and in the type U and type P equilibria we have
where » U = p (¾ + 2®¼)(¾ + 4® ¡ 2®¼) and » P = p (¾ + 2® + 2®¼)(¾ + 2® ¡ 2®¼). Substituting the N j 's into the Bellman equations yields a complicated but not intractable system (details are available upon request).
and type F equilibria exist in exactly the same regions of parameter space, while the type U and type P equilibria exist for smaller regions than in the base model. It may be surprising that the type U and type P equilibria exist for smaller regions, since it would seem that our base assumption discourages on-the-job search. However, with a two point x distribution it really does not. Suppose, e.g., you are in an x 1 match and searching. Since next person you meet cannot generate any less than x 1 , the base assumption that you cannot stay with your old partner is not binding, and simply serves as a tie-breaking rule. However, there is a general equilibrium e®ect: if the tie-breaking rule is to go with the new person, relationships are less stable and agents are therefore more inclined to search.
We conclude several things. First, the alternative model is more complicated. Second, at least for the case where x has a two-point distribution the two models generate the same qualitative implications { the exact regions where some of the equilibria exist di®er slightly, but the basic theorems on existence, multiplicity, and e±ciency continue to hold; in particular, it is still the case that equilibrium is either e±cient or involves too much search. Finally, for the case of a general x distribution the alternative model is really very complicated. These considerations, as well as the fact that our base model focuses attention on within-relationship e®ects, suggest that when we consider a general distribution F (x) in the next section it makes sense to stick with the base assumption. 
The General Model
The general match quality distribution is F (x). If it is di®erentiable we denote the density by f (x), but we do not especially need di®erentiability.
We will focus on equilibria with the following property: unmatched agents accept partners i® x¸R where R is called the reservation match quality; and matched agents search i® x · Q where Q is called the critical match quality. 13 Moreover, we concentrate on equilibria with Q > R, since we want some on-the-job search (su±cient conditions for this are given below).
An equilibrium now is de¯ned as a list including the value functions for To begin the analysis, observe that V 0 satis¯es the standard equation from search theory
ifying what happens when a relationship breaks up (prenuptial agreements or severance packages). As we discuss this in the Conclusion, sometimes this will change the results and sometime it will not. In any event, there are certainly situations where such contracts are not enforceable { e.g., a worker or a spouse can simply run o® { and the model applies without quali¯cation. 1 3 Although this class of equilibria seems very natural, that there can be equilibria not in this class can be seen from the type P equilibrium the previous section. In any case, we will show that there are plenty of equilibria even with this class.
where R satis¯es V (R) = V 0 . Similarly, V (x) satis¯es
In any equilibrium with Q > R, agents search in relationships at the reservation match value (i.e., x = R implies s = 1). Therefore,
Comparing (8) and (6), one sees immediately that R = b + d, and so unmatched agents form relationships i® the instantaneous return net of search
We next derive a quasi-reduced-form version of V (x). First rewrite (7) as
(b + ®I)=r and rearrange to yield
For future reference, note that
after integrating by parts and inserting V 0 (x) from (9). This gives I = I(Q)
as a function of Q; otherwise, I depends only on exogenous variables. Equation (9) expresses a matched agent's payo® as a function of match quality x, his search behavior s, the search behavior of his partner S, and the equilibrium value of Q, which determines the behavior of other agents since it is taken as given that they search while matched i® x · Q. Denoting this by v sS (x; Q), we have:
v 00 (x; Q) = rx + ¾b + ¾®I(Q) r(r + ¾) : Figure 4 shows the four v ij functions. Notice that they are linear in x, with @v 00 =@x > @v 01 =@x = @v 10 =@x > @v 11 =@x. Also, as shown in the¯gure, we
Given all agents search i® x · Q, your value function V (x) is given by maxfv 01 ,v 11 g when your partner is searching and maxfv 00 ,v 10 g when your partner is not searching, as shown by the thick line in the diagram. is, given that your partner is searching, your best response switches from searching to not searching as x crosses q 1 (Q). Figure 4 depicts a situation where Q is arbitrary except that b + d < q 0 (Q) < Q < q 1 (Q) (we show below this will be the case). We claim that this implies it is an equilibrium for all agents to search while matched i® x · Q. To see why, suppose that everyone else searches i® x · Q: then if you are in a match with x · Q, your partner searches, and so you want to search because x < q 1 (Q); and if you are in a match with x > Q, your partner does not search, and so you do not because x > q 0 (Q). This establishes the claim.
It is not obvious that the situation depicted in Figure 4 , b + d < q 0 (Q) < Q < q 1 (Q), will actually arise. To show that it does we¯rst equate v 0j = v 1j and rearrange to yield
As shown in Figure 5 , the functions q 0 (Q) and q 1 (Q) are strictly decreasing.
Therefore each has at most one¯xed point. We now make the following mild parameter restriction, which always holds if d is not too big:
This basically says F is such there is some net gain to searching at
It is not hard to verify that (11) guarantees q 0 (b + d) > b + d, and so thē xed point of q 0 (Q), call it q, satis¯es q > b + d. Also, q > b + d guarantees q 1 (q) > q, and so the¯xed point of q 1 (Q), call it q, satis¯es q > q.
Summarizing the above analysis, we have the following.
Proposition 5 Assuming (11) holds, we have b + d < q < q, as in Figure 5 .
Then we can choose any Q 2 [q; q] and have Figure 4 . This means that any Q 2 [q; q] is consistent with equilibrium.
What is behind this continuum of equilibria? One answer goes along the following lines. Consider a simple, static, two-player game where agents can either cooperate or defect, parameterized by ½, representing, say, the payo® to joint cooperation. Suppose that the game has multiple equilibria, one Intuitively, whatever fundamental impact ½ may have in this game, it can also be used as a signal or coordinating device determining which equilibrium to play once ½ is realized. The same thing applies in our model. The realization of x has fundamental value as the utility you get from the match, but it can also be a signal indicating whether to be \faithful" in the match.
Since we know from the previous section that there can be multiple equilibria in the game where partners choose whether to search, using the value of x relative to Q as a coordination device is consistent with equilibrium for any Q in some range. Of course, if x is too small (big), then agents will (will not) want to search regardless of what their partner is doing; this is why the range of equilibrium Q is bounded.
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We also want to reconcile the results for the special model where x 2 fx 1 ; x 2 g with the above Proposition. In the general case, we de¯ne an equilibrium in terms of the value of Q, and we have established that there is a continuum of equilibrium values of Q. However, if F puts weight on only a discrete number of values of x, then some of these equilibrium values of Q are observationally equivalent. For example, whether you stop searching at Q = 140 or Q = 160 does not matter for the outcome if x 2 f100; 200g.
Hence, with a two point distribution we could de¯ne an equilibrium in terms whether or not you search in an x j match, S j , and there are a¯nite number of these outcomes.
So far we know that R = b + d and that any Q in [q; q] is consistent with equilibrium. To complete the characterization we need to describe the distri-bution of agents across states. The following is one of the main results in the paper, as it yields the mapping between the exogenous F (x) and the endogenous N 0 and G(x), and hence gives the key to discussing how unemployment and inequality vary across equilibria. The proof, which involves manipulating di®erential equations for the numbers of agents in di®erent states, then imposing stationarity and solving, is in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 Given Q and R, the steady state unemployment rate is
and the distribution of x across existing matches is
Notice G(x) · F (x) for all x with strict inequality on the interior of the support (stochastic dominance). Moreover, G is continuous at x 6 = Q as long as F is, but in any case G has a kink at Q. Thus, if F has density f then G has density g , where:
Increasing Q from Q 1 to Q 2 shifts g up for x < Q 1 and x > Q 2 , and shifts g down for x 2 (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) (see the next section, where we provide an explicit example). Hence, equilibria with higher Q entail more inequality. Also, from (12), increasing Q raises N 0 . Hence, equilibria with higher Q entail more unemployment.
It remains to discuss welfare. In the class of outcomes under consideration, given R and Q average lifetime income can be expressed as
With some work, this can be simpli¯ed to
. We now solve the planner's problem of maximizing W by choosing R and Q. To ease the presentation assume F has density f. Also, let us concentrate on the case Q > R, since otherwise there is no on-the-job search. 16 In the Appendix we prove:
Proposition 7 Given Q > R, the solution to the planner's problem is R = b + d and the value of Q that solves T o (Q) = 0, where
To see this, note that in the proof of the proposition we show the solution to the planner's problem entails R = b + d and Q = Q o where Q o satis¯es T o (Q o ) = 0. Since T o is an increasing function, and the above condition is merely a simpli¯cation of
One thing this implies is that the equilibrium value of R = b + d is e±cient. We now show that the on-the-job search decision is not e±cient, and indeed that Q is always too high, at least in the limiting case where r ! 0. Hence, exactly as in the previous section, there tends to be too much search in equilibrium when r is not too big. Again, the proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 8 Given Q > R, the planner's choice of Q is below q and therefore below any equilibrium Q, at least for r not too big.
Summarizing the results in this section, here is what has been established.
There exist values q and q > q such that any Q 2 [q; q] is consistent with equilibrium. Given the mild parameter condition in (11), we have q > b + d and therefore Q > b + d in any equilibrium. We know that R = b + d is e±cient, but at least for r not too big Q is ine±cient { all equilibria entail too much on-the-job search. Therefore, given the solution for N 0 and G(x),
we know that all equilibria also have too much unemployment and too much inequality.
A Calibrated Example
To see quantitatively how much on-the-job search and endogenous instability might matter, in this section we provide numerical results to compare the model's predictions to some labor market data (it would also be interesting to confront marriage market data, but we start here with the labor market). As mentioned in the Introduction, the numbers concerning employment°ows, especially job-to-job transitions, are important, and it seems interesting to see what this model has to say about them. While some of the model parameters are calibrated more easily than others, it turns out that when we were unsure of their values we tried a variety of choices and the results reported below are fairly robust.
We assume the exogenous distribution F (x) is log-normal, where Ex = 100 and we set the log of the standard deviation somewhat arbitrarily to 1.
The functional form of F is not particularly important for the key statistics reported below. 17 We calibrate the model to a period 1 month in order to facilitate comparison with the labor market data discussed below. This would suggest setting r so that (1 + r) 12 = 1 +r wherer is the observed annual interest rate. We do report results forr = :04 below, but for our base model we setr ¼ 0 simply so that our theoretical welfare results in Proposition 8 apply unambiguously. We will see below that this does not matter very much for the main point, although we did¯nd that for big r there can be too little as opposed to too much on-the-job search in equilibrium, as we know from the theoretical analysis.
Two key parameters are b and d. We set d ¼ 0 since: (i) this allows us to avoid worrying about whether the out-of-pocket cost of search is higher on or o® the job; and (ii) we already have a high implicit cost of on-thejob search built into the model, due to the assumption that when you meet someone new you cannot go back to your current partner. We then set b = 37 (compare to Ex = 100) according to the following logic. In equilibrium a certain fraction of new entrants to the unemployment pool come from unstable matches (x < Q) and the rest from stable matches (x > Q). The former typically have been matched for a very short time (a few months), and so we would like to give them a UI payment of b = 0; the latter have typically been matched for a much longer time, and we would like to give them b equal to half their previous earnings. Since we do not want to complicate things by having b depend on employment experience, we give every unemployed agent the same b, calibrated so that on average it yields the right replacement ratio.
The remaining parameters are calibrated from labor market numbers. Fallick and Fleischman (2001) use CPS data from January 1994 to December 2000 to generate measures of the°ows between unemployment, employment, and out of the labor force, and also job-to-job transitions. Consolidating unemployment and out of the labor force into one state N 0 , the monthly probability of transiting from N 0 to employment is P 0e = :068, and the probability of transiting the other direction is P e0 = :041 in their sample.
They also¯nd a job-to-job transition rate of P ee = :027. Given the transition rates, one can solve the steady state condition N 0 P 0e = (1 ¡ N 0 )P e0 for the stock of people not employed, N 0 = :376. 18 We do not calibrate to P ee or N 0 ; rather, given F , b and d we simply set ® and ¾ to match P ue and P eu , and check later to see what the model predicts about the other numbers.
Of course, since there are multiple equilibria we need to choose one; for calibration purposes we choose the best (the one with the lowest Q), which implies ® = :099 and ¾ = :0101.
Although we calibrate to the best equilibrium, we will also report results for the worst, to see just how much endogenous instability can matter. It is straightforward to solve the model numerically for the best and worst equilibrium values of Q, which we called q and q > q in the previous section, by solving for the¯xed points of q 0 (Q) and q 1 (Q) ( Figure 5 ). We then use Proposition 6 to compute N 0 and the distribution of x across existing matches in steady state, G(x). We use Proposition 7 to compute the e±cient Q (which is unambiguously below q, given r ¼ 0). As we know from the previous section, the planner picks the same value of R as the equilibrium,
In terms of on-the-job search, the planner picks Q = 228, the best equilibrium is q = 233, and the worst is q = 300. Figure 6 shows g(x) in the best and worst equilibrium (the e±cient g looks very similar to the best equilibrium since the planner's Q is close to q, so it is not shown).
Figure 6: Distributions of Match Quality
Some things are common across all equilibria, so we describe these¯rst.
Given any Q, the model predicts the expected duration in the N 0 state is about 15 months { which matches the data, of course, since this is e®ectively what we calibrate to. What is more interesting is the expected durations in unstable or unstable relationships, since we only calibrate to the average; these are about 5 and 99 months, respectively. Hence, stable (unstable) relationships are very stable (unstable) here. In any equilibrium, an unmatched agent encounters an o®er each month with probability about :10 and accepts it with probability :69. When an unstable match breaks up, 52% of the time it is because you are abandoned (a layo®), 33% of the time you move directly to a new partner (a job-to-job transition), and 15% of the time you leave your partner to check out someone new but¯nd them lacking and end up unmatched (one might call this a quit).
Comparing across equilibria, in the best (worst) equilibrium, 87% (92%) or new relationships are unstable. Hence, almost everyone starts in an unstable relationship, although since they tend to be short the stock of stable relationships is much bigger in steady state. We denote the stock of agents in unstable (x < Q) and stable (x > Q) relationships by N 1 , and N 2 { which ts with the notation in the simple version of the model, at least in the class of equilibria under consideration. These numbers are given below, along with some statistics on earnings, in Table 1 . Notice for example that Ex is over 4 times higher in stable relationships, implying a strong earnings-tenure correlation. We do not report measures of inequality across equilibria but it is obvious from Figure 6 which way it goes. The The survey data reported by Galt (2001) , although perhaps to be taken with a grain of salt, shed light on this. As mentioned earlier, these data indicate that 13% of workers are actively seeking new jobs and an additional 45% although not actively searching \would consider other opportunities or o®ers." We¯nd 25% (36%) of relationships are unstable in the best (worse) equilibrium. In any case, it may be a better test is to see what the model predicts about job-to-job transitions, which Fallick and Fleischman report as P ee = :027. In the best (worst) equilibrium we get :017 (:024).
Hence, in the equilibrium to which we calibrated we can account for only 63% of the reported job-to-job transitions. We do better (nearly 90%) in the worst equilibrium, but then we have too high a transition rate between employment and unemployment, :057 instead of :041. This feature of the model is quite robust. For example, the table also reports results with discounting at rater = :04 per year (which means we need to re-calibrate ® = :106, ¾ = :012 and b = 42 in order to match P ue , P eu and the desired replacement ratio). The results are similar, although naturally impatient agents search less and hence end up with lower average earnings. Also, we explain a little less of P ee , only about 1=2, again because impatient agents search less. Still, the results are roughly similar, and again the model cannot match both P eu and P ee .
Summarizing, although the model does quite well, in general, a key¯nding is that if we calibrate to P eu we can account for around 1=2 to 2=3 of P ee . This is perhaps not too surprising, as our theory is highly stylized and abstracts from many things. For instance, advance notice of an impending layo® could cause agents to change jobs, even if they would not search while matched if the job was not known to be terminating shortly. Moreover, as we mentioned above, there are reasons to suspect that P ee = :027 may be an overestimate.
Finally, notice that our hands are somewhat tied here, since every job-tojob transition in the model generates a transition of at least one person and possibly two people from employment to unemployment. Doing better at matching both P eu and P ee may well require rethinking this aspect of the model, say by explicitly distinguishing between workers and¯rms, or perhaps trying to calibrate a marriage market version where the assumption is closer to reality. 
Conclusion
Our analytic results suggest that endogenous instability is a interesting force that can lead to multiple (indeed to a continuum of) steady state equilibria, and can lead to ine±ciencies including excessive turnover, unemployment and inequality. Our numerical results suggest that modeling on-the-job search in this way may help to explain certain aspects of the data. Of course, the model is special, and many extensions and generalizations are possible, but we think the basic message is sound and that some of the analytic methods we have developed { say, for characterizing the equilibrium distribution G { should be applicable in a variety of alternative speci¯cations.
In terms of extensions, one could allow for di®erent arrival rates for unemployed and employed agents, or more generally for a continuous choice of search intensity, in order to endogenize arrival rates. Our discrete choice model, where you either search or you don't, made some things easier but the main results should be robust. It may be interesting to allow the match value x to vary over time within a relationship (Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] ), or to have learning about x (Jovanovic [1979] ; Wright [1986] ), since these provide additional sources of endogenous job destruction. One would like to know how much job destruction is due to changes in x, to learning, and to on-the-job search; one would presumably also like to know how much is e±cient, as some versions of the¯rst two models imply, and how much is ine±cient, as our model implies.
It might be interesting to introduce ex ante { as opposed to match speci¯c { heterogeneity, or for some other reason have partners potentially disagree about the value of the match. This would force one to think about countero®ers when one's partner meets someone new, and perhaps also about o®ering partners enough to keep them o® the market in the¯rst place. For these as well as other considerations one would like to introduce transferrable utility. For labor market analysis it may also be important to extend things to explicitly include both¯rms and workers, and for the marriage market to explicitly include men and women. We thought it was useful to¯rst work out the case with one type, although clearly the generalization would be interesting theoretically and quantitatively.
A big issue to consider is the robustness of our welfare conclusions. We believe the e®ects the model demonstrates concerning excessive search and turnover are real and important, but naturally there are forces going the other way. In particular, societies may develop institutions to mitigate this type of ine±ciency. The church, the extended family, and related institutions all typically strive to encourage \faithfulness," for instance. One can imagine that investment in match-speci¯c capital (perhaps children) would make the cost of separation higher, which could reduce search while matched. Of course, instability also makes investments in such capital more risky. Reputational e®ects could also come into play; e.g., a scarring e®ect of separations as a social norm could discourage on-the-job search, even if there is nothing fundamental signaled by past separations. Whether or not the relevant ine±ciencies can be generally eliminated by such institutions, or by contracts, is worth studying in detail.
Our preliminary work on contracts indicates the following: Suppose that agents can sign binding agreements for severance (alimony) upon separation { if i leaves j for whatever reason, i pays j a lump sum Z. In the case of a coordination failure, such a contract can eliminate the ine±ciency even if we set Z = 0; all that is required is for the two agents to negotiate to not to search on-the-job. In the coordination failure case, such an agreement is self-enforcing. In the case where the ine±ciency is along the lines of a prisoner's dilemma, however, this is not true: the ine±ciency can still be eliminated, but this requires Z > 0. Still, there are many situations where such agreements are simply not possible or not enforceable. Moreover, it is only in a very special situation where bilateral contracts can eliminate all the ine±ciencies. With non-constant returns in the matching technology, e.g., we would generally require multilateral contracts, including agreements between agents who have not yet met. Could this rationalize governmentimposed severance pay or¯ring restrictions?
As we said, this is worth studying in much more detail, but we leave it and the other extensions for future research. The goal here was to illustrate how endogenous instability works in a relatively simple context, to develop some tools for analyzing its implications, and to see what a numerical version of the model implied. We use the unimprovability principle: to check whether strategies constitute an equilibrium, it su±ces to show the payo®s from using these strategies cannot be improved by deviating, in any possible contingency, once and then reverting to the candidate strategies. Consider the payo® to deviating from A 2 = 0 by accepting an x 2 match. It cannot be optimal to accept the match and then search, given A 1 = A 2 = 0, so we know S 2 = 0. This means rV 2 = x 2 + ¾(V 0 ¡ V 2 ), which implies ¢ 2 is proportional to x 2 ¡ b. Hence, ¢ 2 · 0, and A 2 = 1 does not improve your payo®, i® x 2 · b. Similarly, A 1 = 1 does not improve your payo® i® x 1 · b, which is not binding given x 2¸x1 . Hence, the type D equilibrium exists i® x 2 · b, as claimed. Now consider a type F equilibrium, where A 1 = A 2 = 1 and S 1 = S 2 = 0.
This implies
For this to be an equilibrium, we require ¢ 1¸0 , which can be seen from straightforward algebra to hold i® x 2 · y 1 where y 1 is de¯ned above, and ¢ 2¸0 , which is not binding. We also require § 1 · 0, which holds i® x 2 · y 2 where y 2 is de¯ned above, and § 2 · 0, which is not binding. Hence, this equilibrium exists i® x 2 · y 1 and x 2 · y 2 , as claimed.
The type U and type P equilibria are symmetric, in terms of the algebra, since in each case A 1 = A 2 = 1 and S j = 0 for one of the two types of matches. The type U equilibrium implies
The relevant inequalities can be shown to hold i® x 1¸b + d and x 2¸y3 , as claimed. Similarly, the relevant inequalities for the type P equilibrium can be shown to hold i® x 2¸b + d and x 2 · y 4 .
Finally, consider a type C equilibria. This is a little more complicated because, although we know A 1 = 0, A 2 = 1 and S 2 = 0 in a type C equilibria, we need to specify S 1 di®erently depending on parameters { i.e., even though no one accepts an x 1 match in equilibrium, it matters what agents believe about S 1 o® the equilibrium path. First, the value functions satisfy rV 0 = b + ®¼(V 2 ¡ V 0 ) rV 1 = x 1 + (¾ + S 1 ®)(V 0 ¡ V 1 )
Now suppose we set S 1 = 1 if x 2¸y5 , S 1 = 0 if x 2 · y 6 , and S 1 2 (0; 1) if It is now a simple matter of solving for the parameter values such that each choice yields the greatest value of W . ¥ Proof of Proposition 6: As a preliminary step, we take G(x) as given, and observe that the number of unmatched agents evolves according to:
This says that the°ow into the set of unmatched agents is the number of matched agents who su®er an exogenous separation plus the number of matched agents who are abandoned by their partner or meet someone with 
We now derive G(x). First note that G(R) = 0. Next, denote the measure of agents who are matched with match quality x · ¹ x by ¹(¹ x) = (1¡N 0 )G(¹ x). 
We can solve for G(Q) by setting x = Q in (20) and rearranging:
Then we can substitute (21) into (20) Hence, there is a unique Q satisfying this condition. To check that it constitutes a maximum, we check the second order conditions. After simpli¯cation using the¯rst order conditions, the Hessian matrix conveniently reduces to
Hence, the second order conditions hold, and the proof is complete. ¥ Proof of Proposition 8: We know the e±cient Q is the solution to (17).
We also know that Q is an equilibrium if and only if it is in the interval [q; q], where q is the solution to q 0 (Q) = Q. In the limiting case r = 0, q 0 (Q) = Q can be rewritten T e (Q) = 0, where
after integrating by parts to replace R (1 ¡ F )dx terms with R xdF terms.
Observe that T o and T e are both increasing in Q, and that given R = b + d,
Hence, T o lies above T e for all Q > R, and therefore q exceeds the planner's solution. Hence, any equilibrium Q exceeds the planner's solution. ¥
